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Abstract
We analyze a discrete-time, infinite-horizon model of elections. In each period, a
challenger is chosen from the electorate to run against an incumbent politician in a
majority-rule election, and the winner then selects a policy from a multidimensional
policy space. Individuals’ policy preferences are private information, whereas policy
choices are publicly observable. We prove existence and continuity of equilibria in
“simple” voting and policy strategies; we provide examples to show the variety of
possible equilibrium patterns in multiple dimensions; we analyze the effects of patience
and office-holding benefits on the persistence of policies over time; and we identify
relationships between equilibrium policies and the core of the underlying voting game.
1 Introduction
Elections occupy a central position in the determination of public policies in repre-
sentative democracies. By selecting the individuals whose subsequent decisions de-
termine final policy outcomes, elections resolve conflicts among competing majorities
and transform the preferences of voters into collective choices. It is well-known that,
when the policy space is one-dimensional and voters have single-peaked preferences,
a single policy outcome, the ideal point of the median voter, is majority-preferred to
all others. In the canonical model of Downs (1957), in which two candidates commit
to policy platforms before a single election, this drives the candidates to the median
and yields a unique Nash equilibrium of the electoral game. When the policy space
is multidimensional, however, majority undominated (or “core”) points rarely exist
(McKelvey and Schofield 1987; Plott 1967; Schofield 1983). Moreover, in the absence
of a core point, results from social choice theory show that the entire space of policy
alternatives will be contained in a majority preference cycle (McKelvey 1976, 1979;
Austen-Smith and Banks 1999), suggesting to some authors (e.g., Riker 1980) the
instability of policies over time. In contrast to that literature, where coalitions are
assumed to form fluidly, we explicitly model electoral institutions and the incentives
of individuals (in their roles as voters and politicians), which might constrain the
formation of coalitions and limit the potential instability of collective choices.
Our objective is not to explain a particular political phenomenon, but rather to
improve our general understanding of electoral processes, with special interest in their
dynamic and informational aspects. Thus, we consider a model of repeated elections
in which politicians determine policies in a multidimensional issue space and in which
preferences (modelled quite generally) are private information. Our focus is on foun-
dational issues, such as the formulation of an appropriate equilibrium concept, the
existence of equilibria, the stability of policies over time, and the relationship between
equilibrium policies and the core. The framework we construct captures the strategic
incentives of politicians, whose private preferences and concern for re-election con-
fronts them with a trade-off in choosing policies, and the strategic calculus of voters,
who must anticipate the future policy choices of incumbent politicians and challengers.
But, because our interest is initially limited to a few topics, and because part of our
contribution is to solve some technical difficulties that arise in a multidimensional
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model of elections, our model omits several important considerations: for example,
the role of parties, the entry decision of challengers, and strategic interaction among
politicians. Nevertheless, we have sought to provide a solid theoretical foundation
from which these issues can be approached in the future.
Most analyses of elections have followed the Downsian tradition in highlighting
the pre-election campaign aspects of the competition for the role as representative. In
the basic model, each of two otherwise identical candidates simultaneously announces
a policy to be implemented if elected, with voters then casting their ballots for the
candidate offering their preferred policy. While originally presented as a model of a
single election in a one-dimensional policy space with office-motivated candidates and
complete information, subsequent research has analyzed repeated elections (e.g., Boy-
lan and McKelvey 1995; Duggan and Fey 2001), multiple dimensions (e.g., Kramer
1978), policy-motivated candidates (e.g., Calvert 1985, Wittman 1983), and incom-
plete information (e.g., Hinich, Ledyard, and Ordeshook 1972). All of this work,
however, has retained the important underlying assumption of the Downsian model
that the winning candidate will faithfully carry out her announced policy. This com-
mitment assumption is often rationalized on the grounds that, if a candidate broke a
campaign promise, there would be some (unmodelled) electoral punishments inflicted
in the future. This maneuver effectively “black boxes” a principle component of the
public policy process, namely, why representatives behave as they do while in office.
An alternative approach, beginning with the work of Barro (1973) and Ferejohn
(1986) and sometimes referred to as models of “electoral accountability,” sheds the
commitment assumption and ignores the role of campaign announcements. In any one
election voters either re-elect the incumbent, i.e., the representative from the previous
period, or else elect a previously untried challenger, with the winning individual then
choosing the policy for the current period. In contrast to the Downsian model, voters
base their decisions on the past performance of incumbents, rather than their current
promises, and, thus, these models are inherently dynamic. In selecting policies, rep-
resentatives typically care not only about winning, but also about their actions while
in office, either through their own policy preferences or else in terms of the “effort”
expended on their constituents’ behalf. And, with the exception of Barro (1973),
incomplete information is present: either the motivations of the representatives are
2
known but their influence over policy, and hence over voter utility, is not (Ferejohn
1986; Austen-Smith and Banks 1989), or their influence over policy is known but
their motivations are not (Duggan 2000; Bernhardt, Dubey and Hughson 1998; Reed
1994), or neither is known (Rogoff 1990; Banks and Sundaram 1993, 1998; Coate and
Morris 1995; Fearon 1998). To date, however, all of this work has maintained the
original Downsian assumption of a unidimensional policy space, conceptualized either
as a space of effort levels or (more conventionally) as an ideological dimension. In
fact, many of these models are further simplified by the assumption that there is just
one voter.1
In this paper, we propose a model of electoral accountability in which policies may
lie in a subset of any finite-dimensional Euclidean space. Each of a continuum of voters
has preferences represented by a continuous and strictly concave utility function. In
each period, a challenger is drawn from the electorate to run against the incumbent
in a majority-rule election, with the winner choosing the policy for that period. The
process then moves to the next period, and the above sequence of events is repeated
ad infinitum. Voters observe the policies chosen by the representatives but not their
preferences. Thus, incomplete information in the form of adverse selection is present,
and elections confront voters with a non-trivial problem: they must update their
beliefs about the incumbent based on her past policy choices and compare this to the
expected policy outcomes upon electing a challenger. Representatives, being chosen
from the electorate at large, have well-defined policy preferences of their own and face
a trade-off in choice of policy: they have short term incentives to choose policies in
their personal interest, but they have long term interests in staying in office. Doing so,
a representative may capture certain “non-policy” benefits of office, while obtaining
policy outcomes better than expected from a challenger. But pursuit of personal
policy interests may reveal information to voters that damages the representative’s
chances of re-election.
We prove the existence of “simple” equilibria in which voters use strategies that
are retrospective (Fiorina 1981) in the following sense: an individual votes for re-
1The remaining distinction among papers in this category is whether a finite term limit on the
incumbent (or a finite horizon) is imposed (Austen-Smith and Banks 1989; Reed 1994; Coate and
Morris 1995; Banks and Sundaram 1998; Bernhardt, Dubey, and Hughson 1998; Fearon 1998) or
not (Barro 1973; Ferejohn 1986; Rogoff 1990; Banks and Sundaram 1993; Duggan 2000).
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election if and only if her utility in the previous period was at or above a fixed
critical level, this level determined endogenously as the expected value of an untried
challenger. Thus, in equilibrium, she also votes “prospectively,” as though pivotal
in the current election. Faced with such voter behavior, individuals in their role as
representatives have an incentive to adopt history-independent strategies in which
they choose the same policy whenever elected, allowing us to reconcile retrospective
and prospective voting. We show through a series of examples how a wide variety
of policy and re-election patterns can emerge in equilibrium, particularly in multiple
dimensions. It is possible that no representative is ever re-elected, each choosing her
ideal policy while in office and failing to gain the support of a majority of voters.
With different parameter values, it is possible that all types of representative can and
do receive majority support, with the first being re-elected continually over time. It
may be that, in such examples, a representative must find some “compromise” policy
sufficient to ensure re-election but not too far from her ideal. Or it may be that a
representative can win by simply choosing her ideal policy.
When all types are re-elected, the first individual to hold office will remain there,
choosing the same policy in every period, demonstrating that an extreme form of
stability, or “policy persistence,” can occur in the model. We prove that, if non-
policy benefits of holding office are sufficiently high or individuals are sufficiently
patient (and non-policy benefits are positive), then all simple equilibria exhibit such
policy persistence. Patience on the part of the voters and representatives can produce
this stability in any number of dimensions, even in the absence of a core point. If
non-policy benefits are zero, then it turns out that patience leads to policy persistence
unless there is a core point, so that the presence of a core point can actually be a
destabilizing force. Even then, however, we are able to show that the set of policies
acceptable to a majority of voters collapses to the core as patience increases. When
patience is great enough, therefore, either policy persistence obtains, or the long run
distribution of policies is concentrated arbitrarily closely to the core.
We then examine the connection between simple equilibrium policies and the core,
especially in the one-dimensional special case of the model. We first show it is possible
that all representatives choose the same policy in equilibrium, a phenomenon we call
“policy coincidence,” only if non-policy office benefits are sufficiently high, individuals
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are sufficiently patient, and a core point exists. In that case, all representatives must
choose the core point, and we say that the equilibrium exhibits “core equivalence.”
In one dimension, the core is always non-empty and consists of the median voter’s
ideal point, and we can show that, if there are sufficient benefits of office or sufficient
patience (with positive non-policy benefits), then there is a unique simple equilibrium.
In it, all representatives choose the median, giving us full core equivalence and new
game-theoretic foundations for the original Downsian median voter theorem — but in
a fully dynamic model of elections with asymmetric information and no commitment.
If holding office confers no non-policy benefit, then core equivalence need not obtain,
but we show that, as voters become more patient, the set of policies that ensure re-
election, and the long run distribution of equilibrium policies along with it, collapses
to the median.
In multiple dimensions, where the core is typically empty, it follows that policy
coincidence will be the exception. Thus, in equilibrium, some representatives choose
distinct policies. Then, when voters are sufficiently patient and non-policy benefits of
office are sufficiently high, our policy persistence result implies that multiple policies
can be sustained in equilibrium. Such a conclusion comes not from a multiplicity of
equilibria, but rather from the possibility that representatives with different policy
preferences have the willingness and ability to attract and maintain different majority
coalitions within a single equilibrium. In this way, when the policy space is multi-
dimensional, two electorates with identical voter preferences can be associated with
distinct stable policies.
Before proceeding, the connections between our paper and three others are note-
worthy. The structure of our model is similar to that of Duggan (2000), with the key
differences being that the latter assumes a one-dimensional policy space and “tent-
shaped” Euclidean distance utilities. The existence of simple equilibria is proved, and
it is shown that, in all such equilibria, the median voter is decisive: a policy choice by
an officeholder secures re-election if and only if it gives the median voter a payoff at
least equal to the median’s expected payoff from electing a challenger. Alesina (1988)
also assumes a one-dimensional policy space in a repeated elections setting, but in
a two-candidate, simultaneous-move model without commitment. The preferences
of the candidates are known to the voters, and include both policy and non-policy
5
components. He shows that, when discount factors are high enough, a range of policy
outcomes can be sustained in equilibrium when voters and candidates employ trigger
strategies of a certain form. Finally, Kramer (1977) studies a two-candidate model
of repeated elections in multiple dimensions that is, otherwise, dissimilar to ours: in
any period, the challenger may commit to a policy, while the incumbent is bound to
her previous policy choice. Challengers maximize their margin of victory, and politi-
cians and voters are myopic. He shows that, when voters have Euclidean preferences,
equilibrium policies converge to the “minmax” set, a set that coincides with the core
when the latter is non-empty.
2 The Model
LetX ⊂ <d denote a compact and convex set of policies, let N = [0, 1] be a continuum
of individuals, and let the possible preferences of voters be indexed by a finite set
T of types, denoted t. Each individual i’s type ti is drawn from the distribution
ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρ|T |), where ρt > 0 is the probability of type t. We extend the idea of
independent types to the current model (which posits a continuum of individuals) as
follows: the distribution of an individual’s type, conditional on the types of any finite
number of other individuals, remains ρ. We assume that the law of large numbers
holds, so that, with probability one, the fraction of type t individuals is ρt for all
t ∈ T .2 Any one individual’s type is private information, but the distribution ρ is
common knowledge. The preferences of type t individuals are represented by a utility
function ut on X, assumed to be continuous and strictly concave. We normalize
payoffs so that ut(x) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ T and all x ∈ X. Let xt = argmax{ut(x) : x ∈ X}
denote the unique ideal policy for type t individuals. Assume that xt 6= xt′ for all
t, t′ ∈ T , and note that, by strict concavity, ut(xt) > 0 for all t ∈ T .
Of interest later is the weighted majority voting game among the types in T , with
weights given by the proportions (ρ1, . . . , ρ|T |) of types present in the electorate. Let
D = {C ⊆ T : ∑
t∈C
ρt > 1/2}
2We also assume that, for each type t, the set {i ∈ N : ti = t} is Lebesgue measurable with
probability one. Judd (1985) establishes the existence of a joint distribution of voter types for
which these conditions are satisfied for almost all realizations of voter types. See Banks and Duggan
(2001b) for rigorous foundations of this model.
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denote the decisive coalitions of types. We impose the condition that there is no
coalition of types C ⊂ T such that ∑t∈C ρt = 1/2, i.e., no coalition of types has
precisely half of the population. This implies that the voting game is strong, in the
following sense: for all C ⊆ T , either C ∈ D or T \C ∈ D. The core is the set, K, of
policies that are undominated in this voting game, i.e.,
K =
{
x ∈ X : there do not exist y ∈ X and C ∈ D
such that, for all t ∈ C, ut(y) > ut(x)
}
.
Because X is convex and utility functions are strictly concave, it follows that K, if
non-empty, will be a singleton. Denote this core policy by xc. In addition, K = {xc}
satisfies the following external stability condition: for all y 6= xc, {t ∈ T : ut(xc) >
ut(y)} ∈ D. It is known that, because D is strong, the core is typically empty when
X is multidimensional,3 but, in one dimension, the core is always non-empty and
is equal to the ideal policy of the weighted median type. Defining m as the unique
element of T satisfying
{t ∈ T : xt ≤ xm} ∈ D and {t ∈ T : xt ≥ xm} ∈ D,
we therefore have xc = xm.
Elections proceed as follows. In period 1, an individual is randomly chosen as
representative and selects a policy in X. In each period τ = 2, 3, . . . , an individual
is selected as representative as follows. A challenger is randomly drawn from the
uniform distribution on N to run against the incumbent, the representative from
period τ − 1. Individuals observe the “name” of the challenger, but not her type.
Once the challenger is determined, each individual casts a vote in {In, Ch}, where In
denotes a vote for the incumbent and Ch a vote for the challenger. If the proportion
of individuals voting for the incumbent is at least one-half, then the incumbent wins
the election and becomes the period τ representative. Otherwise, the challenger wins.
The period τ representative selects any policy in X, this selection is observed by the
voters, and the game moves to the next period, where this process is repeated. Note
that, since the distribution on N is nonatomic, the probability any given individual
is chosen to run as challenger in any given period is zero.
3See Banks (1995) and Saari (1997). When types are equally represented in society, the voting
game is simply majority rule, and the core is generically empty when d ≥ 2. For arbitrary weighted
majority voting games, more dimensions are needed for this result.
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A public history of length τ , denoted hτ , describes the publicly observed events
in the first τ periods, namely, the individuals chosen as representatives, those chosen
as challengers, vote tallies from elections, and policies selected by winners. An infi-
nite public history, h∞, is an infinite sequence of these variables. In particular, let
{iτ} denote the corresponding sequence of representatives and {xτ} the sequence of
policies. An individual i’s payoff from an infinite public history h∞ is then defined as
(1− δ)
∞∑
τ=1
δτ−1[uti(x
τ ) + ωi(i
τ )β],
where δ ∈ [0, 1) is a common discount factor, β ≥ 0 is a common non-policy benefit
from being representative, and ωi is the indicator function on N taking on the value
of one if i = iτ and zero otherwise.
A strategy for i ∈ N describes, for any time period τ , a vote vτi ∈ {In, Ch} and
a policy pτi ∈ X if selected as representative, both functions of the public history of
length τ − 1. Because types are private information, we follow Harsanyi (1967-68)
in modelling votes and policy choices as also depending on an individual’s type. We
focus on equilibria in which the individuals’ strategies are especially simple. First,
individuals employ retrospective voting rules: for all i ∈ N , there exists ui:T → <
such that, for all t ∈ T , all τ ≥ 1, and all hτ−1,
vτi (h
τ−1, t) = In if and only if ut(xτ−1) ≥ ui(t).
That is, i votes to retain the incumbent if and only if the incumbent’s most recent
policy choice satisfied the utility standard, or “cut-off,” ui(t). This cut-off is time-
invariant, consistent with a “What have you done for me lately?” attitude on the
part of the voters. Second, individuals’ policy choices are history-independent: for all
i ∈ N , there exists pi:T → X such that, for all t ∈ T , all τ ≥ 1, and all hτ−1,
pτi (h
τ−1, t) = pi(t).
Thus, i chooses the same policy any time she is elected as representative. Note
that these two requirements are mutually re-enforcing: if voter strategies depend on
history only through the incumbent’s last chosen policy, then an incumbent’s policy
decision problem looks the same in all periods she is selected. Hence, if an individual
has an optimal policy strategy, then she necessarily has an optimal strategy that is
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history-independent. Similarly, if representatives adopt history-independent policies,
then knowledge of the last policy chosen by an individual is sufficient for a voter to
accurately predict that individual’s policy choices in all future periods.
To resolve equilibrium existence issues, we must, however, complicate our descrip-
tion of policy choice strategies by allowing for “mixing” by representatives, i.e., the
arbitrary choice of policies over which the representative is indifferent, in the first
term of office. To preserve the idea of history-independence, we look for equilibria
in which, after that initial policy choice, the individual then chooses the same policy
in every subsequent term of office. Formally, we represent mixing over policies of a
representative i, newly elected in period τ , as a Borel probability measure piτi , which
again is a function of public history and i’s type. Let P(X) denote the set of Borel
probability measures on X, endowed with the topology of weak convergence.4 Thus,
we focus on equilibria in which policy choices by individual i, newly elected in period
τ , can be described by a mapping pii:T → P(X) such that, for all t ∈ T , all τ ≥ 1,
and all hτ−1,
piτi (h
τ−1, t) = pii(t).
Here, pii(t)(Y ) is the probability that type t of individual i initially chooses a policy
in the (measurable) subset Y ⊆ X, that policy being chosen by i whenever she is
re-elected.
A simple strategy for i consists of a pair σi = (pii, ui). A simple strategy profile,
denoted σ = (pii, ui)i∈N , specifies a simple strategy for every individual with the
added restriction of type-symmetry: ui(t) = uj(t) and pii(t) = pij(t) for all i, j ∈
N and all t ∈ T . Abusing notation slightly, let ut denote the cut-off and pit the
mixed policy choice strategy used by all type t voters. We will also use the notation
pi = (pi1, . . . , pi|T |) for a profile of mixed policy choice strategies. Let S(σ) denote
the support of the policy strategies in σ, i.e., the smallest closed subset of X with
probability one under pit for all t ∈ T .
Any strategy profile σ induces a probability distribution over infinite histories
from the beginning of the game (prior to selecting the first representative), and with
4A sequence {pin} of probability measures on X weakly converges to a probability measure pi if,
for all (bounded) continuous functions f :X → <, we have ∫ fdpin → ∫ fdpi. Since the policy space
X is a compact metric space, the set P(X) will be compact in this topology. See Aliprantis and
Border (1994, Theorem 12.10).
9
it an expected utility vi(σ, t) for every i ∈ N and t ∈ T .5 Since challengers are drawn
from the uniform distribution on N , in almost all histories a challenger will not have
held office previously. By our independence assumption, therefore, the voters’ beliefs
about a challenger’s type are given by ρ after almost all histories. By our restriction
to simple strategies, then, vi(σ, t) is also i’s expected utility, or continuation value,
of replacing the current incumbent with an untried challenger, after almost every
history.6 Further, since individuals of the same type, say t, have a common per-period
utility function, a common discount factor, and common beliefs about challengers,
they will have the same continuation value, which we henceforth express as vt(σ).
Informally, a simple strategy profile σ∗ constitutes a simple equilibrium if, for all
t ∈ T , pi∗t is a “best response” whenever a type t representative makes a policy choice
and u∗t is a “best response” in every vote.
3 Simple Equilibria
In this section, we give conditions on a simple strategy profile σ formalizing the idea
that voting and policy choice strategies are best responses for all individuals. Our
optimality condition on voting strategies is, essentially, that individuals decide to
retain or replace the current incumbent based on which candidate offers the higher
payoff. That is, voters act as though “pivotal” in the current election,7 voting for
the incumbent if the expected utility from re-electing her is at least as great as
the expected utility from electing an untried challenger. The latter, for a type t
of individual i, is simply vt(σ). As for retaining the incumbent, suppose x ∈ X is
the incumbent’s policy choice in the previous period. Since individuals are adopting
history-independent policy choice strategies, the incumbent will continue to select x
in the current period if retained. If σ determines that the incumbent subsequently
be replaced, then the expected utility to i from retaining the current incumbent is
5See Banks and Duggan (2001b) for an explicit construction of this distribution.
6We do not consider the probability zero set of histories in which a challenger has previously held
office. After such histories, continuation values would be defined to reflect updating based on all
relevant information.
7Baron and Kalai (1993), in a model with a finite number of voters, refer to such strategies as
“stage-undominated.” With a continuum of voters, no voter will ever be pivotal, but our equilibrium
condition captures the same intuition.
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(1− δ)ut(x) + δvt(σ), which is greater than vt(σ) if and only if ut(x) is greater than
vt(σ). If σ determines that the incumbent be forever retained, then the expected
utility to i from retaining the current incumbent is simply ut(x), and so again retaining
the incumbent is preferred by i if and only if ut(x) is greater than vt(σ). Thus, the cut-
off ut = vt(σ) captures the decision of a pivotal voter.
8 Our best response condition
for voting strategies is therefore that, for all t ∈ T ,
ut = vt(σ).
Note that, while we have described the voters’ strategies as “retrospective” because
votes are determined by simple cut-off rules, they are actually “prospective” as well in
equilibrium: an individual votes for an incumbent only when retaining the incumbent
generates a higher expected future payoff than that generated by replacing her.
Given that individuals of the same type adopt common cut-off rules and that ρt
is the actual proportion of type t voters, the voting stage, from the perspective of the
candidates, is simply a weighted voting game among the types in T , with decisive
coalitions D. This simplifies the statement of the best response condition on the
policy strategies, because an incumbent is retained if and only if the set of types
voting for the incumbent is in D. For each t ∈ T , let
At(σ) = {x ∈ X : ut(x) ≥ ut}
denote the acceptance set for type t individuals, i.e., those policies satisfying the
cut-off ut and inducing all type t individuals to vote for the incumbent. By the
compactness and convexity of X and the continuity and concavity of ut, this set is
compact and convex. For each coalition C ⊆ T of types, define the set
AC(σ) =
⋂
t∈C
At(σ)
of those policies inducing all types t ∈ C to vote for the incumbent. As the intersection
of compact and convex sets, AC(σ) is compact and convex as well. Finally, define
A(σ) =
⋃
C∈D
AC(σ)
8Strictly speaking, the prediction of x here is justified by Bayesian updating about the incum-
bent’s type only following histories consistent with σ. If x /∈ S(σ), for example, then we are “off
the path of play,” and actually no beliefs about the incumbent’s type will lead to the prediction
of x. We can, however, still provide beliefs about the incumbent’s type to rationalize the cut-off
ut = vt(σ). We discuss this further in Section 8.
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as those policies that receive majority support and will, therefore, lead to re-election
of the incumbent. This social acceptance set is compact but not necessarily convex
(cf. Example 2 below).
Suppressing for the moment the dependence of the set A on the profile σ, the
choice for the type t of individual i when representative is to either select a policy
x ∈ A (if non-empty), in which case she is retained for the next period, or select a
policy x /∈ A and subsequently be replaced. Clearly, choosing any x 6= xt from outside
of A is dominated by simply choosing xt, so we will ignore that option. Additionally,
if xt ∈ A, then she will optimally select this as her policy in all periods and remain as
incumbent forever, and we will only consider such strategies. Otherwise, i.e., when
xt /∈ A, the representative faces a trade-off: selecting xt in the current period and
being replaced versus choosing a ut-maximizing policy from A and being retained.
The payoff from choosing xt /∈ A is equal to
(1− δ)[ut(xt) + β] + δvt(σ),
reflecting the one-time payoff from the representative’s ideal point, followed by the
continuation value of an untried challenger thereafter. Further, if choosing from A is
optimal in the current period, then it will remain so in all future periods, and any
ut-maximizing policy from A will remain ut-maximal in all future periods. Let
Mt(A) = argmax{ut(x) : x ∈ A}
denote the set of best socially acceptable policies for a type t individual. Our best
response condition for policy choice strategies is therefore that, for all t ∈ T , (i) when
a type t representative prefers to remain in office, i.e.,
sup{ut(x) : x ∈ A}+ β > (1− δ)[ut(xt) + β] + δvt(σ),
she choose from the best policies that ensure re-election, i.e., pit(Mt(A)) = 1, (ii)
when the inequality is reversed, pit({xt}) = 1 (and the representative is replaced in
the next period), and (iii) when equality holds, pit(Mt(A)∪{xt}) = 1. This completes
our definition of simple equilibrium.
Note that, since AC is compact and convex and ut is strictly concave, the set
argmax{ut(x) : x ∈ AC} will be a singleton for each coalition C of types. Since
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Mt(A) is a subset of the (finite) union of these sets over C ∈ D, the set Mt(A) will
be finite for all t ∈ T . Since Mt(A) is finite for all t and there is a finite number of
types, the set S(σ) of chosen policies will be finite in equilibrium.
The forgoing shows how representatives, themselves members of the electorate,
take into consideration the future policy consequences — even after being removed
from office — of their current policy decisions. By choosing her best available policy
from the social acceptance set A, a representative can guarantee that this policy
remains in effect forever. Alternatively, she can choose from outside of A, with the
future policy consequences of such an act summarized by σ. Which of these two
options is preferred then depends on the location of her best policy in A relative to
her ideal policy (i.e., her best policy in X) and her continuation value, as well as the
value of future policies relative to those of the present (represented by the discount
factor δ) and the non-policy benefits of remaining in office (β).
Given a simple strategy profile σ, a type t individual’s continuation value satisfies
vt(σ) =
∑
t′∈T
ρt′
[
[1− pit′(A(σ))][(1− δ)ut(xt′) + δvt(σ)] +
∫
A(σ)
ut(x)pit′(dx)
]
.
The first term in the brackets is the probability that the current representative chooses
from outside A(σ) multiplied by t’s expected payoff in that case, which is simply one
period of the representative’s ideal policy followed by her removal and subsequently
“starting over.” The second (integral) term gives t’s expected payoff if the current
representative selects from A(σ), in which case, by history-independence, the latter
will make the same decision and be re-elected in all future periods. Manipulating this
equation to get an explicit solution, we have
vt(σ) =
∑
t′∈T ρt′
[
[1− pit′(A(σ))](1− δ)ut(xt′) + ∫A(σ) ut(x)pit′(dx)]
1− δ∑t′∈T ρt′ [1− pit′(A(σ))] ,
which is a convex combination of the one-period payoffs to t conditional on rep-
resentatives choosing from outside A(σ) (i.e., ut(xt′)) and from inside A(σ) (i.e.,∫
A(σ) ut(x)pit′(dx)/pit′(A(σ))). Thus, vt(σ) can be written as the expectation of ut
with respect to a probability distribution over X, where elements in X\A(σ) receive
relatively less weight (by a factor of 1− δ) as these policies are “temporary,” whereas
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policies in A(σ) are “permanent.”9 Now define
x(σ) =
∑
t′∈T ρt′
[
[1− pit′(A(σ))](1− δ)xt′ + ∫A(σ) xpit′(dx)]
1− δ∑t′∈T ρt′ [1− pit′(A(σ))] ,
which is a similarly weighted average of equilibrium policies. Thus, x(σ) is the ex-
pected outcome associated with the probability distribution over X induced by σ.
By strict concavity of utility functions, ut(x(σ)) ≥ vt(σ) for all t ∈ T , with this in-
equality strict unless all individuals of all types choose the same policy when in office.
Therefore, x(σ) ∈ At(σ) for all t ∈ T whenever σ satisfies the best response condition
for voters, and so the set A(σ) of policies that lead to re-election will always include
at least x(σ) and will, therefore, be non-empty.
A consequence of these observations is that, whenever σ satisfies the best response
condition for voters, we have
max{ut(x) : x ∈ S(σ)} ≥ vt(σ) ≥ min{ut(x) : x ∈ S(σ)}. (1)
Suppose |S(σ)| > 1. By strict concavity of ut and our assumption that ρt′ > 0 for all
t′ ∈ T , we then have ut(x(σ)) > vt(σ) for all t ∈ T . Since x(σ) ∈ A(σ), this implies
max{ut(x) : x ∈ A(σ)} > vt(σ).
This, with ρt > 0, implies that both of the inequalities are strict in (1). In particular,
vt(σ) > min{ut(x) : x ∈ S(σ)},
from which we conclude that, for all t ∈ T , there exists p ∈ S(σ) such that ut(p) <
vt(σ). That is, as long as more than one policy is chosen, each type votes against
some of the equilibrium policies, and so against some types of incumbent following
some policy choices (cf. Example 2). Put differently, “you can’t please any of the
people all of the time.”10
9Formally, we define the “continuation distribution” of σ, denoted ψ, as follows: for measurable
Y ⊆ X,
ψ(Y ) =
∑
t∈T ρt[(1− pit(A))(1− δ)µxt(Y ) + pit(Y ∩A)]
1− δ∑t∈T ρt(1− pit(A)) ,
where µxt is the point mass on xt.
10See Example 2, in the following section. It is important to note that this does not imply that
each equilibrium policy receives some negative votes: see Example 3, in which the policy offered by
the centrally located type is accepted by all.
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In equilibrium, because the social acceptance set is non-empty, there will al-
ways exist policies representatives could choose to ensure reelection. The question is
whether they find it optimal to do so. With this in mind, given a simple equilibrium
σ∗, partition the set T of types into three subsets, W (“winners”), L (“losers”) and
C (“compromisers”) as follows:
W (σ∗) = {t ∈ T : xt ∈ A∗}
L(σ∗) = {t ∈ T : xt /∈ A∗ and pi∗t ({xt}) > 0}
C(σ∗) = {t ∈ T : xt /∈ A∗ and pi∗t (Mt(A∗)) = 1},
where A∗ = A(σ∗) in the above. Thus, winning types find their ideal policy acceptable
to a majority, and so implement this policy in all periods. Compromising types are
not so fortunate, but they still find some acceptable policy as good as choosing their
ideal policy and subsequently being replaced, and they always choose such a policy.
Finally, losing types have the opposite preference, in that no acceptable policy is
better than simply choosing their ideal policy and subsequently being replaced, and
a positive fraction of these types do choose the latter option. In the next section, we
show by way of a series of examples that any one of these sets, or even two, may be
empty in equilibrium.
This is of interest because the emptiness or non-emptiness of these sets largely
determines the equilibrium dynamics of elections in our model. In particular, if
L(σ∗) = ∅, then all representatives choose policies in the social acceptance set. The
first individual to hold office is therefore re-elected, and, by history-independence,
remains in office forever, implementing the same policy in each period. We refer to
this as perfect policy persistence. In this case, the voters’ continuation values take on
a quite simple form, as now everyone knows that, if the incumbent is removed, then
whatever policy is chosen next will remain in place forever. Thus, we can rewrite
vt(σ
∗) more simply as a convex combination of utilities on S(σ∗), the (finite) set of
policies adopted in equilibrium:
vt(σ
∗) =
∑
t′∈T
ρt′
 ∑
x∈S(σ∗)
pi∗t′({x})ut(x)
 .
Recall that, even when all types compromise, each type votes against some types of
incumbent following some policy choices, as long as more than one policy is chosen
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in equilibrium.
On the other hand, if L(σ∗) 6= ∅, then the first representative and any newly
elected challenger will, with positive probability, choose a losing policy and be replaced
in the following period. As long as it is not the case that pi∗t (A
∗) = 0 for all types,
however, a representative will (with probability one) eventually be elected and choose
a policy in the social acceptance set, where again this policy remains in place forever.
We call this eventual policy persistence. When it obtains, the long run distribution of
policy outcomes puts probability one on the social acceptance set, though the short
run distribution may put positive probability on policies outside the social acceptance
set chosen by losing types.
4 Examples
Example 1: “all losers” equilibrium
Let d = 2, |T | = 3, ut(x) = 1 − (‖xt − x‖)2, β = 0, ρt = 1/3 for all t, 1 = ‖xt − xt′‖
for all t, t′ ∈ T . Assuming all individuals propose their ideal policy and subsequently
are replaced, the continuation value for any individual is given by vt = (1/3)(1) +
(2/3)(0) = 1/3, i.e., in all periods there is a 1/3 chance of having their ideal policy
being chosen, generating a utility of 1, and a 2/3 chance of some other type’s ideal
policy being chosen, generating a utility of 0. What needs to be checked is that
individuals in their role as representative prefer this losing strategy to compromising.
For a type t individual, the closest point in A∗ to xt is (1 −
√
2/3) away, since all
individuals have continuation value equal to 1/3 and utility is quadratic. Thus, t can
either lose and receive (1−δ)(1)+δ(1/3), or compromise and receive 1− (1−
√
2/3)2.
Grinding through the algebra, we see that losing is preferred as long as δ < (5/2) −
3
√
2/3 ≈ .05. Further, since losing is strictly preferred, the equilibrium is unaffected
if β is positive and small enough.
Example 2: “all compromisers” equilibrium
Let the parameter values be the same as in Example 1, except for δ. Consider Figure
1, from Baron’s (1991) model of spatial bargaining.
[ Figure 1 here. ]
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We claim that the following constitutes an equilibrium for δ sufficiently large: all type
1 individuals select policy a and set u1 = u1(c), all type 2 individuals select policy c
and set u2 = u2(e), and all type 3 individuals select e and set u3 = u3(a). Given these
cut-offs, each type is optimizing conditional on choosing from A∗, and, further, if
individuals adopt these policy strategies, then their cut-offs are indeed equal to their
continuation values. Thus, what remains to be checked is whether representatives
are optimizing by selecting from A∗, rather than choosing their ideal points. By
symmetry, we need only check this condition for one type, say type 1. The relevant
comparison is between choosing p = a and remaining in office forever, and choosing
p = x1 and being replaced in the following period. The utility of the former is equal
to u1(a), while the utility of the latter is (1− δ)(1)+ δu1(c) = 1− δ(1−u1(c)). Thus,
a type 1 individual prefers to compromise whenever
u1(a) ≥ 1− δ(1− u1(c)),
or equivalently,
δ ≥ 1− u1(a)
1− u1(c) .
Since 1 > u1(a) > u1(c) > 0, the right-hand side of the above expression lies in (0, 1),
and, when δ is above this amount, we have an equilibrium.11
Example 3: “all winners” equilibrium
Let d = 2, |T | = 5, ut(x) = 16 − (‖xt − x‖)4, ρt = 1/5 for all t, x1 = (1, 0),
x2 = (0, 1), x3 = (−1, 0), x4 = (0,−1), x5 = (0, 0). Note that the ideal point of
type 5 is the core point. Assuming all individuals propose their ideal policy and
have it accepted, the continuation value for types 1-4 is given by vt = (1/5)(16) +
(1/5)(15) + (2/5)(12) + (1/5)(0) = 11, while the continuation value for a type 5 is
v5 = (1/5)(16)+(4/5)(15) = 15.8. Hence, type 5 individuals only vote to re-elect their
own, and so an individual of, e.g., type 1 must secure the votes of types 2 and 4 to be
re-elected. Since u2(x1) = u4(x1) = 12 > 11, type 2 and 4 individuals indeed vote to
re-elect type 1 representatives even when they propose their ideal policy. Similarly,
11Note that by the symmetry of the environment we actually have, as in Baron (1991), another
equilibrium where type 1’s select b, type 2’s select d and type 3’s select f , as well as an equilibrium
where half the type 1’s select a and the other half b, half the type 2’s c and the other half d, and
half the type 3’s e and the other half f .
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types 2 and 4 vote to re-elect type 3 representatives when they propose their ideal
policy, and types 1 and 3 vote to re-elect type 2 and type 4 representatives. Finally,
p5 = x5 is acceptable to all types. Since all individuals are implementing their ideal
policy when chosen as representative and remaining as incumbent forever, the policy
strategies are clearly optimal, and we therefore have an equilibrium. A distinguishing
feature of this strategy profile is that it constitutes an equilibrium for every value of
δ and β, regardless of time preferences or non-policy benefits.
Example 4: “mixed” equilibrium
Let X = [−1, 1], |T | = 5, ρt = 1/5 for all t, β = 0, ut(x) = 4 − ‖x− xt‖2, x1 = −1,
x2 ∈ (−1, 0), x3 = 0, x4 ∈ (0, 1), x5 = 1. We construct an equilibrium in which
type 1 and 5 individuals lose, type 2 and 4 individuals compromise at −c and c
respectively (where c ∈ (0, 1)), and type 3 individuals win. With quadratic utilities
and a single dimension, one can show that type 3 individuals are decisive, in the sense
that a proposal will satisfy a majority if and only if it satisfies the median voter (see
Banks and Duggan 2001b, Lemma 2.1), so we only check this continuation value:
v3 = [(2/5)(1− δ)(3)+ (1/5)(4)+ (2/5)(4− c2)]/(1− (2/5)δ). For a type 3 individual
to be indifferent between accepting and rejecting c, we set v3 equal to 4−c2. Grinding
through the algebra, we find the desired value for c is
c(δ) =
√
2− 2δ
3− 2δ .
Note that c(1) = 0, c(0) =
√
2/3, and c′ < 0. Since c(δ) is bounded away from 1,
there exists a positive δ, say δ+, for which type 1 and 5 individuals prefer to lose
rather than compromise. Now set x2 slightly to the left of −c(δ+) and x4 slightly to
the right of c(δ+), so that type 2 and 4 individuals prefer to compromise. See Figure
2.
[ Figure 2 here. ]
The equilibria in Examples 2 and 3 exhibit perfect policy persistence, in that the
first representative remains as incumbent forever by choosing the same acceptable
policy in every period. In contrast, the equilibria in Example 4 exhibits eventual
policy persistence: only types 2, 3, and 4 choose acceptable policies, and so there will
exist policy variability until such a type is elected.
18
5 Existence and Continuity
Each of the examples above possesses at least one simple equilibrium. Our first result
establishes existence of equilibrium generally.
Theorem 1 There exists a simple equilibrium.
Proof: We first prove existence of an equilibrium in a modified version of the above
game, and we then argue that any equilibrium of the modified game corresponds
to an equilibrium in the original game. Augment the set of options available to a
representative to include a “shirk” option, s, interpreted as choosing her ideal point
and then sitting out the next election. If the current incumbent uses the shirk option,
therefore, the voters must choose the challenger in the next period. We focus on
equilibria in which a representative chooses the shirk option whenever her optimal
choice would lose the next election, i.e., if a representative would choose her ideal
point and that policy is not in the social acceptance set, then she chooses to shirk.
These equilibria are distinguished from others in that representatives foresee the result
of choosing xt /∈ A∗, taking the initiative by choosing s and declining to run, instead
of choosing xt and forcing voters to replace them.
A policy strategy for type t individuals is now a Borel probability measure p˜it
on X˜ = X ∪ {s}.12 Given a profile p˜i = (p˜i1, . . . , p˜i|T |), and assuming that all future
representatives who do not shirk are re-elected, the continuation value of electing a
challenger for a type t voter can be expressed as a function of p˜i only:
vt(p˜i) =
∑
t′∈T
ρt′
[
p˜it′({s})[(1− δ)ut(xt′) + δvt(p˜i)] +
∫
X
ut(x)p˜it′(dx)
]
,
implying
vt(p˜i) =
∑
t′∈T ρt′ [p˜it′({s})(1− δ)ut(xt′) +
∫
X ut(x)p˜it′(dx)]
1− δ∑t′∈T ρt′p˜it′({s}) .
Note that vt is a continuous function of p˜i with the topology of weak convergence on
P(X˜), the Borel probability measures on X˜. We look for an equilibrium in terms
of policy strategies only, since individuals vote for the incumbent if and only if the
12We define Y˜ ⊆ X˜ to be open if Y ⊆ Y˜ ⊆ Y ∪ {s} for some open Y ⊆ X.
19
continuation value of the incumbent is at least that of a challenger. That is, a type t
individual votes to re-elect if and only if the incumbent chose a policy in the set
At(p˜i) = {x ∈ X : ut(x) ≥ vt(p˜i)}.
For each t ∈ T , the set At(p˜i) is non-empty, compact, and convex by the continuity
and concavity of ut. If p˜it({s}) < 1, then let
y(p˜it) =
∫
X xp˜it(dx)
1− p˜it({s})
denote the expected outcome associated with a type t incumbent conditional on the
incumbent not shirking. If p˜it({s}) = 1, then let y(p˜it) be defined arbitrarily. By the
concavity of ut, the policy
x(p˜i) =
∑
t′∈T ρt′ [p˜it′({s})(1− δ)xt′ + (1− p˜it′({s}))y(p˜it′)]
1− δ∑t′∈T ρt′p˜it′({s})
therefore satisfies ut(x(p˜i)) ≥ vt(p˜i), and hence x(p˜i) ∈ At(p˜i), for all t. As in Section
2, for all C ∈ D, define AC(p˜i) = ⋂t∈C At(p˜i), also non-empty, compact, and convex.
And define A(p˜i) =
⋃
C∈D AC(p˜i), non-empty and compact but not necessarily convex.
By an argument similar to that found in Banks and Duggan (2000), one can show
that A(·) is a continuous correspondence on [P(X˜)]T , the set of profiles of policy
choice strategies over X˜.
Given p˜i, an incumbent chooses a policy or shirks so as to maximize her discounted
expected payoff. Thus, define Ut(·; p˜i): X˜ → < by
Ut(x; p˜i) =
{
(1− δ)[ut(xt) + β] + δvt(p˜i) if x = s,
ut(x) + β otherwise,
and let
Mt(p˜i) ≡ argmax{Ut(x; p˜i) : x ∈ A(p˜i) ∪ {s}}.
Because A(·) ∪ {s} is a continuous correspondence, the Maximum Theorem implies
that the correspondence Mt: [P(X˜)]T →→ X˜ has non-empty and compact values,
and it is upper hemicontinuous. It is not necessarily convex-valued, however, since
A(p˜i) ∪ {s} is not convex. Let Bt(p˜i) = P(Mt(p˜i)) denote the set of probability
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measures over optimal choices, which defines a non-empty, compact- and convex-
valued correspondence. Moreover, by Aliprantis and Border’s (1994) Theorem 14.14,
Bt is upper hemicontinuous. Define the correspondence B: [P(X˜)]T →→ [P(X˜)]T by
B(p˜i) = B1(p˜i)×B2(p˜i)× · · · ×B|T |(p˜i),
which inherits these properties. Since [P(X˜)]T is compact and convex, Glicksberg’s
(1952) theorem yields a fixed point of B, say p˜i∗ = (p˜i∗1, . . . , p˜i
∗
|T |). Then p˜i
∗, together
with cut-off rules
u∗t = vt(p˜i
∗), t = 1, . . . , |T |,
constitutes an equilibrium of the augmented game in which individuals either shirk
or are re-elected. Finally, it is easy to see how equilibria in the augmented game
translate into equilibria of the original game: for all t ∈ T and for all measurable
Y ⊆ X, set
pi∗t (Y ) = p˜i
∗
t ({s})µxt(Y ) + p˜i∗t (Y ),
where µxt is the point mass on xt.
In proving existence, we need to allow for the possibility that individuals of the
same type adopt different policies while in office, i.e., we allow “type-asymmetry”
with respect to policy choices. This comes about because, as seen in Example 2, the
social acceptance set A(σ) need not be convex, and so we may have a situation in
which two distinct policies x, y ∈ A(σ) are optimal for type t individuals and yet no
convex combination of x and y is in A(σ). In addition, even if A(σ) is convex, type t
individuals may be indifferent between choosing (optimally) from A(σ) and choosing
xt /∈ A(σ), with no convex combination giving as high a payoff. Allowing some type
t individuals to choose one policy when in office while others choose another, and
then having these proportions determined in equilibrium, effectively smooths out, or
“convexifies,” representative behavior from the perspective of the voters.
We next show that the set of equilibrium policies changes in a nice way as one
varies the underlying parameters of the model. So far these parameters include the
type distribution ρ, which we assume lies in the set
∆◦ = {ρ : ∀ C ⊆ T,
∑
t∈C
ρt 6= 1/2},
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the common discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1), and the common non-policy benefit β ∈
<+. To these we add information about the type-specific utility functions, so as to
evaluate the effects of changing preferences on the equilibrium policies. We do this
by parameterizing the utility functions as ut(x) = ut(x, λ), where λ lies in Λ ⊂ <k.
For instance, all types could have quadratic utilities, with λ = (x1, . . . , x|T |) being the
vector of ideal points. More generally, λ might consist of ideal points and matrices
defining weighted Euclidean distance (cf. Hinich and Munger 1997). We assume that
each ut is jointly continuous in its arguments.
Let E(ρ, δ, β, λ) denote the set of simple equilibrium policy strategy profiles given
parameters ρ, δ, β, and λ. Thus, we can view E as a correspondence from the pa-
rameter space ∆◦ × [0, 1)×<+ × Λ into the space of profiles of probability measures
on policies, [P(X)]T . We say that E is upper hemicontinuous if, for every (ρ, δ, β, λ)
in this space and for every open set Y ⊆ [P(X)]T with E(ρ, δ, β, λ) ⊆ Y , there
exists an open set Z ⊆ ∆◦ × [0, 1) × <+ × Λ with (ρ, δ, β, λ) ∈ Z such that, for all
(ρ
′
, δ
′
, β
′
, λ
′
) ∈ Z, E(ρ′ , δ′ , β ′ , λ′) ⊆ Y . In words, “small” variations in the parameters
cannot lead the set of equilibrium policies to “blow up.”
Theorem 2 The correspondence E is upper hemicontinuous.
Proof: We first consider the augmented game defined in the proof of Theorem 1.
Given parameters (ρ, δ, β, λ), with ρ ∈ ∆◦, and strategy profile p˜i = (p˜i1, . . . , p˜i|T |), let
θ denote the vector (ρ, δ, β, λ, p˜i), and define
At(θ) = {x ∈ X : ut(x, λ) ≥ vt(p˜i, ρ, δ, λ)}
where vt is a type t individual’s continuation value as defined above but using ut(·, λ).
By an argument similar to that in Banks and Duggan (2000), we can show that
A(θ) ≡ ⋃
C∈D(ρ)
[⋂
t∈C
At(θ)
]
is continuous as a correspondence at θ, where, since ρ ∈ ∆◦, D(ρ) is constant on an
open set containing ρ. Define Ut(·; θ): X˜ → < by
Ut(x; θ) =
{
(1− δ)[ut(x, λ) + β] + δvt(p˜i, ρ, δ, λ) if x = s,
ut(x, λ) + β otherwise.
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Since Ut(x; θ) is continuous in (x, θ), the Maximum Theorem implies that
Mt(θ) ≡ argmax{Ut(x; θ) : x ∈ A(θ) ∪ {s}}
is upper hemicontinuous at θ, and therefore so is Bt(θ) ≡ P(Mt(θ)). Since Bt has
closed values and regular range as well, it has closed graph at θ (Aliprantis and Border
1994, Theorem 14.17). Now let (ρm, δm, βm, λm)→ (ρ, δ, β, λ) ∈ ∆◦× [0, 1)×<+×Λ,
take any sequence {pim} of policy choice profiles in the original game such that pim ∈
E(ρm, δm, βm, λm) for all m, and suppose pim → pi. Transform these into policy
choice profiles, {p˜im} and p˜i, in the augmented game in the obvious manner, e.g., if
xt /∈ A(pim), then define p˜imt ({s}) = pimt ({xt}). Thus, p˜imt ∈ Bt(θm) for all m and
p˜im → p˜i weakly. Since Bt has closed graph at θ, we have p˜it ∈ Bt(θ) for all t ∈ T .
Therefore, pi ∈ E(ρ, δ, β, λ), and we conclude that E has closed graph. Since it has
compact Hausdorff range as well, it is upper hemicontinuous (Aliprantis and Border
1994, Theorem 14.12).
One of the important consequences of Theorem 2 is the following. If we can solve
for all of the equilibria at some particular parameter values, then we know that,
for values suitably close to this, all equilibria will be close (in the sense of weak
convergence) to the original set: though policies far from this set may occur with
positive probability, that probability must go to zero as we approach the original
parameter values of the model. Hence, when we fully characterize the equilibria in
specific situations, we can be confident that these results are not “knife-edge” and
that they accurately reflect the equilibria in that region of the parameter space.
6 Policy Persistence
Example 1 above showed the possibility of “all losers” in multiple dimensions when δ
and β are sufficiently small. The first result of this section shows that for sufficiently
large δ or β, assuming both are positive, there cannot exist any losers. In that case,
we have perfect policy persistence, i.e., the first representative remains as incumbent
forever by choosing the same policy from the social acceptance set A∗ in every period.
This analysis also identifies a weaker constraint on δ and β under which not all types
are losers, implying eventual policy persistence, i.e., a type of representative who
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selects a policy from A∗, and implements this in all remaining periods, is eventually
chosen. Our last result of the section is that, even when non-policy benefits of office
are zero, sufficiently high δ implies perfect policy persistence, unless the core is non-
empty — and in that case, the social acceptance set, and therefore the long run
distribution of policies, must collapse to the core.
As argued earlier, in any simple equilibrium σ∗ we must have ut(x(σ∗)) ≥ vt(σ∗)
for all t ∈ T , and, since x(σ∗) ∈ A∗, it follows that uˆt(σ∗) ≡ max{ut(x) : x ∈ A∗}
satisfies uˆt(σ
∗) ≥ vt(σ∗). A type t incumbent will prefer to compromise whenever
uˆt(σ
∗) + β > (1− δ)[ut(xt) + β] + δvt(σ∗).
For every δ < 1, the first term on the left-hand side is strictly greater than the
last term on the right-hand side (recall utilities are non-negative), and, therefore, if
β ≥ (1 − δ)[ut(xt) + β], then it must be that t is not a losing type, i.e., t /∈ L(σ∗).
Rewriting this inequality,
ut(xt) ≤ βδ
1− δ .
Now define
γ = max{ut(xt) : t ∈ T}
γ = min{ut(xt) : t ∈ T},
which are well-defined and positive, since each ut(xt) is strictly positive and T is
finite. The next result is an immediate consequence of the foregoing observations.
Theorem 3 (i) If βδ/(1 − δ) ≥ γ, then L(σ∗) = ∅ in every simple equilibrium σ∗.
(ii) If βδ/(1− δ) ≥ γ then T\L(σ∗) 6= ∅ in every simple equilibrium σ∗.
The theorem has two implications. First, (i) implies that, for every β > 0, there
exists δ ∈ [0, 1) such that, when δ ≥ δ, all simple equilibria exhibit perfect policy
persistence. And, for every δ > 0, there exists β > 0 such that, when β ≥ β, every
equilibrium exhibits perfect policy persistence. Second, using (ii), we can get lower
bounds than these, at the cost of replacing “perfect” with “eventual.”
Since γ is positive, the above result is silent when either β or δ (or both) are
equal to zero. Indeed, it is clear that, when δ equals zero, representatives will simply
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choose their ideal policy while in office regardless of the value of β, implying that,
in certain situations (e.g., Example 1), no representative is ever re-elected. Hence,
eventual policy persistence fails to hold. On the other hand, even when β equals zero,
we can show that, for sufficiently high values of δ, eventual policy persistence must
hold in every equilibrium (e.g., Example 2). To see this, let β = 0 and suppose (to
the contrary) that we can find a sequence {δk} with δk → 1 and a corresponding
sequence {σk} of simple equilibria with acceptance sets {Ak} such that pikt (Ak) = 0
for all t ∈ T and all k. Hence, given any k, each type of officeholder chooses her ideal
point and fails to gain re-election, and so vt(σ
k) is simply
∑
t′∈T ρt′ut(xt′), which is
independent of k. Denote this amount vˆt. Thus, the equilibrium social acceptance
sets, Ak, are also independent of k, which implies max{ut(x) : x ∈ Ak} is independent
of k. Denote this amount uˆt. Since ideal points are distinct and utilities are strictly
concave, uˆt > vˆt. Therefore, for all t ∈ T and for k high enough, we have
uˆt > (1− δk)ut(xt) + δkvˆt.
But then the optimal policy choice for type t representatives is to compromise by
choosing a point in Ak, a contradiction. Therefore, even when there are no non-
policy benefits to office, all simple equilibria exhibit eventual policy persistence, if
the discount factor is sufficiently high.
Theorem 4 There exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that, for all δ ∈ [δ, 1), if σ∗ is a simple
equilibrium with discount factor δ and social acceptance set A∗, then pi∗t (A
∗) > 0 for
some t ∈ T .
We can give another condition sufficient for eventual policy persistence that is
demonstrated in Examples 3 and 4 and that anticipates our results on core equivalence
in the next section. In those examples, the core was non-empty, located at some
type’s ideal point, and in the social acceptance set. So when a representative of that
type is elected, she simply chooses that policy and remains in office. To see that
this generalizes, suppose the core is non-empty, so K = {xc}, and fix an arbitrary
equilibrium σ∗. We first claim that xc ∈ A∗. This follows since x(σ∗) ∈ A∗t for all t ∈ T
(by concavity), and ut(x
c) ≥ ut(x(σ∗)) for a weighted majority of types (by external
stability), implying xc ∈ A∗t for a weighted majority of types. Thus, the core xc is
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an acceptable policy in every equilibrium. In one dimension, we know that the core
point is the ideal point of the weighted median type, i.e., xc = xm, so we know that
type m individuals will always select this as their policy (and subsequently remain in
office for all remaining periods by doing so), implying eventual policy persistence for
all δ and β. In contrast, in multiple dimensions, the core xc need not in general be
equal to any type’s ideal point, even with strictly concave utilities. See Figure 3 for
a simple three-type example.
[ Figure 3 here. ]
But if we add the assumptions that xc is interior to X and that individual utility
functions are differentiable, eliminating the “kinks” in Figure 3, then it must be that
xc = xt for some t ∈ T . The argument is as follows. Take any point y interior
to X and such that y = xt for no t ∈ T . Since T is finite we can find a hyper-
plane H, with normal p, through zero and containing none of the gradient vectors
{∇u1(y), . . . ,∇u|T |(y)}. Since D is strong, either
{t ∈ T : ∇ut(y) · p > 0} or {t ∈ T : ∇ut(y) · p < 0}
is decisive. Without loss of generality suppose the former. Since y ∈ intX, there
exists ² > 0 such that y + ²p ∈ X. Taking ² small enough, ut(y + ²p) > ut(y) for all
t in the first coalition. Therefore, any interior point which is not some type’s ideal
point cannot be in the core, and, hence, if xc exists and is interior, it must coincide
with some type’s ideal point. Just as in the one-dimensional, case this “core” type
will always select xc as her policy, and remain in office forever.
Theorem 5 If d = 1, or if ut is differentiable for all t ∈ T and there exists a core
point xc ∈ intX, then there exists t ∈ T such that pi∗t ({xc}) = 1 and t ∈ W (σ∗) in
every simple equilibrium σ∗.
Thus, in every simple equilibrium, the core point xc always has a positive proba-
bility of being selected by a randomly chosen challenger, and, when it is selected, it
remains as the policy in all subsequent periods. When the core is non-empty, there-
fore, every equilibrium exhibits eventual policy persistence: with probability one a
policy will be selected that remains in place in all subsequent periods. On the other
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hand, we know from Examples 3 and 4 that xc need not be the only policy exhibiting
such persistence.
The final result of this section examines properties of simple equilibria as the
discount factor δ approaches one. From Theorems 3 and 4, we already have two results
on this score: perfect policy persistence must occur if β is positive, and eventual
policy persistence must occur even if β is zero. It turns out, however, that we can
say more: in any environment where β = 0 and where high δ does not imply perfect
policy persistence, the core must be non-empty. Further, in the absence of perfect
policy persistence, the social acceptance sets must converge to the core point, xc.
Convergence here is with respect to the Hausdorff metric (cf. Aliprantis and Border
1994), which for our purposes can be simplified to the following: for any compact
set Y ⊆ X and element x ∈ X, define the Hausdorff distance between Y and x as
h(Y, x) = max{‖y − x‖ : y ∈ Y }. Then a sequence {Y k} of compact sets is said to
“converge to x” if the sequence {h(Y k, x)} converges to zero.
Theorem 6 Let {δk} converge to one. If there exists a corresponding sequence of
simple equilibria {σk} with social acceptance sets {Ak} such that mint∈T pikt (Ak) < 1
for all k, then the core is non-empty, and {Ak} converges to xc.
Proof: Take any sequence {σk} of simple equilibria such that mint∈T pikt (Ak) < 1
for all k. We first show that the core is non-empty. From Theorem 3, we know
that β must equal zero. And since T is finite, there must exist a type t′ ∈ T and
a subsequence (also indexed by k) such that pikt′(A
k) < 1 for all k. It follows that
representatives of type t′ are willing to shirk for all k:
(1− δk)ut′(xt′) + δkvt′(σk) ≥ uˆkt′ ,
where uˆkt′ = max{ut′(x) : x ∈ Ak}. Since {vt′(σk)} and {uˆkt′} lie in compact sets, we
may go to a subsequence (also indexed by k) along which these sequences converge.
It follows that
lim vt′(σ
k) ≥ lim uˆkt′ . (2)
Since uˆkt′ ≥ vt′(σk) for all k, (2) actually holds with equality. Now let ψk be the
distribution on X associated with the kth equilibrium, so that
vt′(σ
k) =
∫
ut′(x)ψ
k(dx)
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for all k. Since X is compact, {ψk} has a subsequence (also indexed by k) that
converges weakly to some probability measure ψ on X. By weak convergence,
lim vt′(σ
k) =
∫
ut′(x)ψ(dx). (3)
Let
x(ψk) =
∫
xψk(dx) and x(ψ) =
∫
xψ(dx),
and note that x(ψk) ∈ Ak for all k by concavity of voter utility functions. Hence,
uˆkt′ ≥ ut′(x(ψk)) (4)
for all k. Using x(ψk)→ x(ψ) and the continuity of ut′ , (2), (3) and (4) yield∫
ut′(x)ψ(dx) = lim vt′(σ
k) ≥ lim uˆkt′ ≥ lim ut′(x(ψk)) = ut′(x(ψ)).
From strict concavity, we conclude that ψ is concentrated on some point xˆ, i.e.,
ψ({xˆ}) = 1. We claim that xˆ is a core point, i.e., xˆ = xc. If not, then there exist
y ∈ X and C ∈ D such that, for all t ∈ C, ut(y) > ut(xˆ). Since
lim vt(σ
k) =
∫
ut(x)ψ(dx) = ut(xˆ),
we have y ∈ Ak for high enough k. Also, we have
ut(y) > (1− δk)ut(xt) + δkvt(σk)
for all t ∈ C when k is high enough. This is implies that, for all t ∈ C, pikt (Ak) = 1
when k is high enough. Let Y ⊆ X be any open set such that xˆ ∈ Y and, for all
t ∈ C and all z ∈ Y , ut(y) > ut(z). For each t ∈ C, clearly pikt (Ak) = 1 implies
pikt (A
k\Y ) = 1. But then ψk does not converge weakly to the point mass at xˆ,
contradicting the above result. We now show that {Ak} converges to the core. If
not, then there is an open set Y with xc ∈ Y and a subsequence (also indexed by
k) {xk} such that, for all k, xk ∈ Ak ∩ (X\Y ). Since X\Y is compact, there is a
subsequence (also indexed by k) and a policy x˜ ∈ X\Y such that xk → x˜. Since D
is finite, we may suppose (going to a subsequence if necessary) there is some C ∈ D
such that, for all k, xk ∈ AC(σk). Thus, for all t ∈ C, ut(xk) ≥ vt(σk). Now, by our
first argument, we may choose a subsequence (also indexed by k) with continuation
distributions {ψk} converging to the point mass on xc, and, therefore, vt(σk)→ ut(xc)
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for all t ∈ T . Then, by continuity, we have ut(x˜) ≥ ut(xc) for all t ∈ C. But then
strict concavity implies ut((1/2)x˜ + (1/2)x
c) > ut(x
c) for all t ∈ C, a contradiction.
Therefore {Ak} → {xc}.
From Theorem 5, we conclude that greater patience leads to perfect policy per-
sistence, except under rather specific conditions. When the core is empty, the typical
case in two or more dimensions, perfect policy persistence necessarily obtains for
discount factors close enough to one. When the core is non-empty, perfect policy
persistence may not obtain: for discount factors arbitrarily close to one, there may be
equilibria in which some types choose their ideal points and fail to be re-elected. In
this case, however, the social acceptance sets corresponding to these equilibria, and
the long run distribution of policies, must converge to the core.
7 Core Equivalence
We have seen that, under weak background conditions, if the core is non-empty, then
there is some type of representative that chooses the core policy and is continually
re-elected. Thus, the long run distribution of policy outcomes puts positive probabil-
ity on the core point. As in Example 3, however, there may be other policy outcomes
that occur with positive probability. In this section, we investigate the conditions un-
der which the core point is the only policy selected in equilibrium, i.e., pit({xc}) = 1
for all t ∈ T , a phenomenon we call “core equivalence.” Note the implication, in
particular, that all representatives must choose the same policy, which we call “pol-
icy coincidence.” Our first result shows that policy coincidence, while conceptually
weaker, is actually equivalent to core equivalence in equilibrium, and it gives a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for policy coincidence to hold. Going to one dimension,
we show that, assuming sufficient patience or non-policy benefits of office (and δ > 0
and β > 0), core equivalence obtains in every simple equilibrium, providing a strong
version of the median voter theorem for repeated elections. When non-policy benefits
are zero, we prove an asymptotic median voter result for patient electorates.
Suppose that, in a simple strategy profile σ, all representatives choose the same
policy, say, pit({xˆ}) = 1 for all t ∈ T . In this case, vt(σ) is simply equal to ut(xˆ), and
so individuals always vote to retain the incumbent and unanimity prevails. Clearly,
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it cannot be an equilibrium for all individuals to adopt a common policy xˆ other than
the core point: there would then be a policy y and a decisive coalition C of types
such that ut(y) > ut(xˆ) = vt(σ
∗) for all t ∈ C, and, hence, any time a member of C is
elected, she would not select xˆ as her policy. Conversely, if xˆ = xc, then we may have
an equilibrium, depending on the values of δ and β. Since xc is the unique core point
and vt(σ) = ut(x
c), it follows from external stability that A∗ = {xc}, and, therefore,
we need only check whether representatives prefer compromising at xc to choosing
their ideal points. If
ut(x
c) + β ≥ (1− δ)(ut(xt) + β) + δut(xc) (5)
for all t ∈ T , then pi∗t ({xc}) = 1 for all t ∈ T is an equilibrium. If this inequality fails
to hold for some t ∈ T , then this is not an equilibrium. Re-arranging (5), we have
δβ
1− δ ≥ ut(xt)− ut(x
c).
Define
γc = max{ut(xt)− ut(xc) : t ∈ T},
and note that, because xt 6= xt′ for all t, t′ ∈ T , we have γc > 0. Note also that γc
is only defined when xc exists, whereas γ and γ are always defined. Since ut(x
c) ≥ 0
for all t ∈ T , it must be that γc ≤ γ when the core is non-empty.
Theorem 7 There is a simple equilibrium with pi∗t ({xˆ}) = 1 for all t ∈ T if and only
if the core is non-empty, xˆ = xc, and δβ/(1− δ) ≥ γc.
As an application, return to Example 3, and note that xc exists and is at the
origin. For all t ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, we have ut(xt) − ut(xc) = 16 − 15 = 1, and, since
x5 = x
c, this difference for t = 5 is zero. Thus, γc = 1. By Theorem 7, therefore,
whenever β ≥ (1 − δ)/δ, we will have a second equilibrium in which all representa-
tives select the core point (0, 0). An immediate consequence of Theorem 7 is that,
when non-policy benefits of holding office are zero, policy coincidence cannot occur
in equilibrium. Another consequence is that, if the core is empty, then policy coinci-
dence, and therefore core equivalence, cannot occur in any simple equilibrium. Since
the core is generically empty in two or more dimensions, we have a negative result
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for policy coincidence in multiple dimensions. Of course, the core is non-empty and
equal to the ideal point of the weighted median type whenever the policy space is
one-dimensional, and Theorem 7 has the following implication.
Corollary 1 If d = 1, then pi∗t ({xm}) = 1 for all t ∈ T is a simple equilibrium if and
only if δβ/(1− δ) ≥ γc.
Thus, as long as the individuals are sufficiently patient and non-policy benefits
are sufficiently high, we can support the Downsian prediction of convergence to the
median in one simple equilibrium of the one-dimensional model. In that case, clearly
all types but the median compromise, and the first representative chosen remains as
incumbent forever, continually implementing xm. We next take up the issue of when
core equivalence obtains in all simple equilibria. Though Example 3 shows that, in
multiple dimensions, other equilibria may exist for all β and δ, we will show that a
strengthening of the condition in Corollary 1 is sufficient for a unique equilibrium
outcome at the core in one dimension. As a step in that direction, our next result
shows that, in one dimension, we can partition the set of equilibria into two distinct
classes: either all representatives choose the median, or else some representatives do
not compromise at all. Thus, in one dimension, perfect policy persistence implies core
equivalence.
Lemma 1 If d = 1, then, in every simple equilibrium σ∗, L(σ∗) = ∅ implies pi∗t ({xm}) =
1 for all t ∈ T .
Proof: Suppose L(σ∗) = ∅, i.e., all types propose policies in A∗ and, hence, are
re-elected. Define
p = min
≤
S(σ∗) and p = max
≤
S(σ∗).
If p = p, then we know from Theorem 7 that S(σ∗) = {xm}, and so it must be that
pi∗t ({xm}) = 1 for all t ∈ T . If p < p, then, by strict concavity of ut
argmin{ut(x) : x ∈ S(σ∗)} ⊆ {p, p}
for all t ∈ T . So define T ⊆ T as those types for which this minimizer is unique and
equal to p, T ⊆ T as the types for which this is unique and equal to p, and I ⊆ T
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as the types for which ut(p) = ut(p). As argued at the end of Section 3, L(σ
∗) = ∅
and |S(σ∗)| > 1 imply vt(σ∗) > ut(p) = ut(p) for all t ∈ I. Therefore, all t ∈ I vote
against incumbents choosing policies p and p, and so the only types voting in favor
of the policy p are those in T , and the only types voting in favor of p are those in
T . Each of these policies is accepted, so it must be that T ∈ D and T ∈ D, i.e.,∑
t∈T ρt > 1/2 and
∑
t∈T ρt > 1/2. However, T ∩ T = ∅, contradiction.
We can now state our sufficient condition, a direct consequence of Theorem 3 and
Lemma 1, for core equivalence in every simple equilibrium.
Theorem 8 If d = 1 and δβ/(1 − δ) ≥ γ, then pi∗t ({xm}) = 1 for all t ∈ T is the
unique simple equilibrium.
Recall from Corollary 1 that policy coincidence at the core constitutes an equi-
librium in one dimension when δβ/(1 − δ) ≥ γc. Theorem 8 establishes that policy
coincidence at the core constitutes the equilibrium when δ and β satisfy the stronger
restriction that δβ/(1− δ) ≥ γ. Thus, when individuals are sufficiently patient (and
β > 0) or non-policy benefits from incumbency are sufficiently high (and δ > 0),
we obtain equivalence in one dimension between the core of the underlying voting
game and we obtain the well-known median voter result from considerably different
microfoundations than the Downsian model of elections: even with incomplete in-
formation, and even when politicians cannot commit to policy platforms, electoral
incentives lead to policy outcomes at the median.
The next result, which follows immediately from Theorem 7 and Lemma 8, shows
that, if non-policy benefits from office or the discount factor are low enough, then
a positive fraction of at least one type of representative does not compromise. In
particular, if β = 0, then, regardless of how patient the individuals are, there will
always exist some uncompromising types. This implies that, with positive probability,
the search for an acceptable representative will last more than one period. We know
from Theorem 5, however, that, with probability one, this search will not last forever.
Corollary 2 If d = 1 and δβ/(1−δ) < γc, then L(σ∗) 6= ∅ in every simple equilibrium
σ∗.
32
An implication of Theorem 8 is that, when β > 0, the social acceptance set A∗
will be equal to the median voter’s ideal point xm for sufficiently large values of δ. On
the other hand, Corollary 2 proves the existence of non-compromising types for every
value of δ when β equals zero, with one implication being that A∗ is always a strict
superset of xm. Our next result shows, however, that, while not necessarily equal to
xm, the social acceptance set A
∗ does indeed converge to xm as δ approaches one.
Theorem 9 Let d = 1, let {δk}∞k=1 be a sequence converging to 1, and for each k let
σk be a simple equilibrium, with social acceptance set Ak. Then {Ak} converges to
xm.
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that there exists a subsequence of {Ak} (also indexed
by k) and some ε > 0 such that, for all k, d(Ak, {xc}) ≥ ε. It follows from Theorem 8
that β = 0, and it follows from Theorem 6 that there exists k such that, for all k ≥ k
and all t ∈ T , pikt (Ak) = 1. But this implies L(σk) = ∅ for all k ≥ k, contradicting
Corollary 2.
Therefore, even when there are no non-policy benefits from holding office, if the
policy space is one-dimensional and individuals are sufficiently patient, then the only
acceptable policies will be those close to the weighted median type’s ideal policy.
In sum, Corollary 2 shows that there will always exist non-compromising types when
β = 0. Theorem 5 shows that, even so, eventually an acceptable policy will be chosen.
And now Theorem 9 shows that, as individuals become increasingly patient, these
acceptable policies will be arbitrarily close to the core, and the long run distribution
of policies will, therefore, be close to the median.
8 Bayesian Foundations
Thus far, we have not paid explicit attention to the issue of beliefs off the equilibrium
path: a representative’s equilibrium policy choice should yield a payoff at least as great
as that obtainable by any deviation; many deviations will produce observed behavior
that is inconsistent with simple equilibrium, as when a representative chooses one
policy in one period and a different policy in the next; and it is important that
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equilibrium strategies following such deviations have a plausible explanation in terms
of rational behavior. Thus, though our definition of simple equilibrium stands on its
own, we would like to be able to specify an individual’s beliefs at all points in the
game in such a way that her behavior is optimal, even after histories that cannot occur
in equilibrium. To be more specific, the problem we take up here is that of assigning
beliefs to rationalize retrospective voting strategies in terms of prospective voting,
where an individual votes for the preferred of two candidates. We will see that this can
be done directly, as long as more than one policy is chosen in equilibrium. Otherwise,
if policy coincidence holds in equilibrium, which is possible by Theorem 7 only if the
core is non-empty and δ and β are sufficiently high, then we must depart slightly from
retrospective voting strategies or history-independent policy choice strategies.
To illustrate the problem, fix a simple equilibrium σ∗. Suppose that a represen-
tative i is a compromising type, say t, and compromises at x = pi(t) ∈ A∗ in her
first period in office, but then chooses her ideal point xt /∈ A∗ in the second period.
Because this path of play has probability zero under σ∗, voters cannot use Bayes rule
to update about the representative’s type, so we must explicitly construct beliefs for
them. If we have voters simply ignore the deviation, then, given that the represen-
tative is indeed using the history-independent policy strategy specified by σ∗, voters
assume the representative will resume compromising in the future, choosing the pol-
icy x in every term of office. By construction, a majority of voters would then vote
to re-elect the incumbent, and the deviation would be profitable. The problem, then,
is to specify voter beliefs and policy choice strategies so as to make such deviations
unprofitable.
In constructing voter beliefs, we must first clarify the nature of mixing over policies
by explicitly modelling the randomization devices used by representatives. We do this
by giving each individual a continuous type set, Θ = [0, 1], which we partition into
intervals {I1, . . . , I|T |} corresponding to types in the original model as follows: each
It has Lebesgue measure ρt, and an individual of type θ ∈ It has utility function ut.
Thus, a random draw from Θ generates the same distribution of policy preferences
as a draw from T in the original model. A history-independent (pure) policy choice
strategy for individual i in this model is a mapping φi: Θ → X, where φi(θ) is the
policy chosen by type θ of individual i in every term of office. We can now give a
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precise interpretation of a mixed policy choice strategy pii from the original model in
terms of a strategy φi. Assume that, for each t ∈ T , pii(t) puts positive probability
on a finite number of policies, say {y1, . . . , yn}, as in a simple equilibrium. Partition
It into intervals {I1t , . . . , Int } such that each Ikt , k = 1, . . . , n, has Lebesgue measure
pii(t)({yk})/ρt. For any given θ ∈ [0, 1], let k be such that θ ∈ Ikt , and define
φi(θ) = y
k.
This yields a step function φi on the individual’s type set with the property that a
random draw from Θ, conditional on θ ∈ It, generates the same distribution on initial
policies as does pii(t) in the original model. This continuous version of the original
model allows us to generate the same distribution of challenger policy choices and the
same continuation values as there but using only pure strategies.
Now take any simple equilibrium σ∗ in the original model such that more than
one policy is chosen by elected representatives, i.e., |S(σ∗)| > 1. Translate this to the
continuous model by replacing pii with φi, as explained above. Suppose individual i
holds office and chooses a policy outside the social acceptance set, say x /∈ A∗ (which
is the only kind of deviation that needs to be addressed seriously). If individual i has
chosen a different policy prior to choosing x, or if x = xt for no t ∈ L(σ∗), then Bayes
rule cannot be applied. In this case, we must construct voter beliefs so that, for all
t ∈ T , (i) if ut(x) < ut, then the expected utility from re-electing the incumbent is
less than the expected utility of a challenger, and (ii) if ut(x) ≥ ut, then the expected
utility from the incumbent is at least the expected utility from a challenger. We
address requirement (i) by using the observation from Section 3 that each type votes
against some type of incumbent following some policy choices, i.e., we have
vt(σ
∗) > min{ut(x) : x ∈ S(σ∗)}.
Let y ∈ S(σ∗) satisfy vt(σ∗) > ut(y). Since y ∈ S(σ∗), there is a type t′ ∈ T from
the original model that chooses y with positive probability, i.e., pit′({y}) > 0. In the
continuous model, the types corresponding to t′ and the choice of y form an interval
Ikt′ , and we specify the voter’s beliefs about the incumbent to be uniform on this
interval. The voter would then expect the representative, if re-elected, to choose y
(= φi(θi) for θi ∈ Ikt′) in every subsequent term of office, so the expected utility from
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the incumbent is, indeed, less than the expected utility from a challenger. We address
(ii) by using
max{ut(x) : x ∈ S(σ∗)} ≥ vt(σ∗)
and similarly assigning beliefs so that the voter believes the incumbent will choose a
policy with utility at least vt(σ
∗). Thus, we can define beliefs for voters so that the
cut-off ut = vt(σ
∗) is consistent with prospective voting.
Now suppose σ∗ exhibits policy coincidence, so there is a unique core point xc
and every representative chooses xc with probability one. Thus, S(σ∗) = {xc} and
vt(σ
∗) = ut(xc). The above construction no longer works because we cannot find
a policy y ∈ S(σ∗) such that ut(y) < vt(σ∗), and this creates the possibility of a
profitable deviation: rather than choose xc, a representative may deviate to choose
xt 6= xc, after which (by history-independence) voters expect the representative, as
well as any challenger, to return to xc; every voter would then be indifferent between
the incumbent and a challenger, and, as we have defined retrospective voting strate-
gies, every voter would then break indifference to vote for the incumbent. We can
address such potential deviations by departing slightly from our definition of retro-
spective voting, while preserving the idea of prospective voting, to have voters break
indifference the opposite way following out of equilibrium histories. That is, we re-
define retrospective voting so that, following a choice of policy x that is inconsistent
with σ∗, a type t individual votes for the incumbent if and only if ut(x) > ut. Then,
of course, a deviation such as the one described above will not be profitable. We view
this as a minor “patch” to be applied to our equilibrium concept for the special case
in which policy coincidence holds.
A more radical solution, that instead departs from history-independent policy
choices, would be to define voting and policy choice strategies as in σ∗ along the path
of play. However, if a representative has ever chosen a policy x 6= xc, then we specify
that she choose her ideal point in all future terms of office, and we specify that all
voters believe the representative is a type t such that xt 6= xc. Thus, in the above
example, when the representative chooses xt rather than the core point, all voters
assume that the representative will continue to choose a policy other than the core
point and, therefore, outside the social acceptance set. Then the challenger would be
elected, and such a deviation would again be unprofitable.
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A last point we wish to make in relation to these issues is the role of incomplete
information in the above analysis. This aspect of the model enters the definition of
simple equilibrium in two ways. First, a voter’s expected utility from a challenger is
given by vt(σ), which involves an expectation over the challenger’s type. Second, and
more subtly, it plays a role in a voter’s expectation of the incumbent’s future policies.
While in Section 3 we simply posited that, after a representative chooses x, voters will
expect x in the future, we have seen in this section that the freedom to specify voter
beliefs after out of equilibrium policy choices is crucial in rationalizing the cut-off
ut = vt(σ) in terms of prospective voting. There is no such freedom under complete
information. In fact, if complete information holds, then history-independence and
prospective voting lead to a unique (and trivial) equilibrium: every representative
simply chooses her ideal point, and an individual votes to re-elect the incumbent if
and only if her ideal point is weakly better than the challenger’s. In particular, the
phenomenon of compromise, where a representative chooses a less than ideal policy
in order to gain re-election, cannot be supported in equilibrium.
To see why this is so, consider a strategy profile in which representatives use
history-independent policy choice strategies and in which some type of representative
compromises at some point x. By retrospective voting, if the representative is re-
elected after x when facing a type t′ challenger, it must be that ut(x) ≥ ut(xt′)
for some majority of voters. Suppose, however, that the representative deviates by
choosing her ideal point. Then her payoff in the current period increases and, by
history-independence, the voters still expect her to choose x in the future. The
representative is, therefore, still preferable to the challenger for a majority of voters,
and she will still be re-elected, making this deviation profitable. Thus, compromise is
impossible. This trivial equilibrium does not generally carry over to the model with
incomplete information, because some representatives with nearly socially acceptable
ideal points could profitably imitate an acceptable type of representative. Incomplete
information makes possible the phenomenon of compromise, which we view as an
intuitively appealing implication of our analysis, and therefore plays an essential role
in our model.
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9 Extensions
The analysis of our model would be complicated, but our results largely unaffected,
by any of several generalizations and extensions. First, Theorems 1-4 would also
hold if the set T of types were a continuum, rather than a finite set: though more
difficult to verify, the continuity properties of A(σ) are quite general with respect
to the set of types (cf. Banks, Duggan, and Le Breton 2002, Proposition 13). Our
assumption that the set of types T cannot be partitioned into equal-sized coalitions
(
∑
t∈C ρt = 1/2 for no C) then becomes untenable, but our other results would also
continue to hold as long as the distribution of preferences among the electorate were
sufficiently “dispersed.” If, for example, voter utilities were quadratic with ideal
points distributed over <d according to some positive density function, then the core
(if non-empty) would be a singleton and would be the ideal point of some voter type.
The proofs of our core equivalence results would then go through unchanged.
Second, though Example 3 shows that core equivalence need not obtain in multiple
dimensions (even when a core point exists and δ and β are arbitrarily high), our
core equivalence results do extend to multiple dimensions for a restricted class of
preferences, namely, when utility functions are quadratic: ut(x) = kt − ||x − xt||2.
Since these functions are differentiable, we know from Theorem 5 that, if the core
point xc exists, then it is the ideal policy of some type. Using Lemma 2.1 of Banks
and Duggan (2001b), we can show that this “core type” is decisive in equilibrium, in
the following sense: a policy is socially acceptable if and only if it is acceptable to
the core voter type. With this result, and the assumption that the core is nonempty,
we can prove results exactly analogous to Lemma 1 and Theorem 8. Of course, the
core is generically empty in multiple dimensions, so the interest in this version of our
core equivalence result is limited. But, from Theorem 2, we know that, when the
core is “close” to nonempty, equilibrium policies will be “close” (in the sense of weak
convergence) to being in the core. See our working paper (Banks and Duggan, 2001a)
for these results and an extended example.
Third, our results would hold if we added an exogenous and time-invariant posi-
tive probability of an incumbent being removed from office (through death, impeach-
ment, etc.), though the results on policy persistence would obviously have to be
re-interpreted in terms of expected duration of tenure in office. In such a model,
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even winners and compromisers, through no fault of their own, would eventually be
replaced, generating richer dynamics for the model. The current formulation, which
admittedly leads to very stark dynamics, was chosen for its simplicity and because the
possibility of turnover does not essentially change our message about voter patience
and non-policy benefits of office.
Fourth, the distribution from which challengers are drawn was assumed equal to ρ
in the above analysis, but all of our results would go through if challengers were drawn
from an arbitrarily fixed distribution, as long as all types had positive probability.
This would simply change the weights on different types in our expression for a
voter’s continuation value, without changing any of the analysis. Theorems 1 and
2, on existence and continuity, would hold even if this distribution varied over time.
We could, for example, have a challenger drawn from the side of a one-dimensional
space opposite that of the incumbent, to capture some notion of party. This would
lower the value of a challenger to an incumbent, yielding weaker conditions for policy
persistence and, therefore, for core equivalence.
Finally, all of our results would hold in a version of the model with a finite num-
ber of voters and a separate, countably infinite pool of potential challengers (who do
not vote) with types identically and independently distributed according to ρ. Sup-
pose a new challenger is drawn in every period to run against the incumbent. The
continuation values of voters and representatives would be unchanged: what is essen-
tial is that no voter perceives a chance that she will be drawn as a challenger, and
no representative perceives a chance that she will be re-drawn as a challenger after
losing an election. The main advantage of this reformulation, aside from avoiding
some technical complexities that arise in a model with a continuum of players, is that
voters are now conceivably pivotal in elections, so that our equilibrium condition on
voting strategies can be justified directly in terms of weak dominance. The obvi-
ous disadvantage is that we must treat voters as essentially different from candidates
(who cannot vote). Our philosophical preference, given this trade-off, is to model
candidates exactly as voters.
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